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Abstract
In this paper, we study the discrete logarithm problem in the finite fields Fqn where n|q−1.
The field is called a Kummer field or a Kummer extension of Fq. It plays an important role in
improving the AKS primality proving algorithm. It is known that we can efficiently construct
an element g with order greater than 2n in the fields. Let Sq(•) be the function from integers to
the sum of digits in their q-ary expansions. We present an algorithm that given ge (0 ≤ e < qn
) finds e in random polynomial time, provided that Sq(e) < n. We then show that the problem
is solvable in random polynomial time for most of the exponent e with Sq(e) < 1.32n. The
main tool for the latter result is the Guruswami-Sudan list decoding algorithm. Built on these
results, we prove that in the field Fqq−1 , the bounded sum-of-digits discrete logarithm with
respect to g can be computed in random time O(f(w) log4(qq−1)), where f is a subexponential
function and w is the bound on the q-ary sum-of-digits of the exponent. Hence the problem is
fixed parameter tractable. These results are shown to be extendible to Artin-Schreier extension
Fpp where p is a prime. Since every finite field has an extension of reasonable degree which is
a Kummer field, our result reveals an unexpected property of the discrete logarithm problem,
namely, the bounded sum-of-digits discrete logarithm problem in any given finite field becomes
polynomial time solvable in certain low degree extensions.
1 Introduction and Motivations
Most of practical public key cryptosystems base their security on the hardness of solving the
integer factorization problem or the discrete logarithm problem in finite fields. Both of the
problems admit subexponential algorithms, thus we have to use long parameters, which make
the encryption/decryption costly if the parameters are randomly chosen. Parameters of low
Hamming weight, or more generally, of small sum-of-digits, offer some remedy. Using them
speeds up the system while seems to keep the security intact. In particular, in the cryptosystem
based on the discrete logarithm problem in finite fields of small characteristic, using small sum-
of-digits exponents is very attractive, due to the existence of normal bases [1]. It is proposed and
implemented for smart cards and mobile devices, where the computing power is severely limited.
Although attacks exploring the specialty were proposed [12], none of them have polynomial time
complexity.
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Let Fqn be a finite field. For β ∈ Fqn , if β, βq, βq2 , · · · , βqn−1 form a linear basis of Fqn over
Fq, we call them a normal basis. It is known that a normal basis exists for every pair of prime
power q and a positive integer n [9, Page 29]. Every element α in Fqn can be represented as
α = a0β + a1β
q + · · ·+ an−1βqn−1
where ai ∈ Fq for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1. The power of q is a linear operation,
αq = a0β
q + · · ·+ an−2βqn−1 + an−1β.
Hence to compute the q-th power, we only need to shift the digits, which can be done very fast,
possibly on the hardware level. Now suppose we want to compute αe where the q-ary expansion
of e is
e = e0 + e1q + e2q
2 + · · ·+ en−1qn−1 (0 ≤ ei < q for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1). (1)
The sum-of-digits of e in the q-ary expansion is defined as Sq(e) =
∑n−1
i=0 ei. When q = 2, the
sum-of-digits becomes the famous Hamming weight. To compute αe, we only need to do shiftings
and at most Sq(e) number of multiplications. Furthermore, the exponentiation algorithm can be
parallelized, which is a property not enjoyed by the large characteristic fields. For details, see
[13].
1.1 Related work
The discrete logarithm problem in finite field Fqn , is to compute an integer e such that g
′ = ge,
given a generator g of a subgroup of F∗qn and g
′ in the subgroup. The general purpose algorithms
to solve the discrete logarithm problem are the number field sieve and the function field sieve (for
a survey see [11]). They have time complexity
exp(c(log qn)1/3(log log qn)2/3)
for some constant c, when q is small, or n is small.
Suppose we want to compute the discrete logarithm of ge with respect to base g in the finite
field Fqn . If we know that the Hamming weight of e is equal to w, there is an algorithm proposed
by Coppersmith, which works well if w is very small. It is a clever adaption of the baby-step giant-
step idea, and runs in random time O(
√
w
(⌊log qn/2⌋
⌊w/2⌋
)
). It is proved in [12] that the average-case
complexity achieves only a constant factor speed-up over the worst case. It is not clear how his
idea can be generalized when the exponent has small sum-of-digits in the base q > 2. However,
we can consider the very special case where ei ∈ {0, 1} for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 and
∑
0≤i≤n−1 ei = ⌊n2 ⌋,
recall that ei’s are the digits of e in the q-ary expansion. It can be verified that the Coppersmith
algorithm can be applied in this case. The time complexity becomes O(
√
n
(⌊n/2⌋
⌊n/4⌋
)
). If q < nO(1),
it is much worse than the time complexity of the function field sieve on a general exponent.
If the q-ary sum-of-digits of the exponent is bounded by w, is there an algorithm which runs
in time f(w) logc(qn) and solves the discrete logarithm problem in Fqn , for a arbitrary function
f and a constant c? A similar problem has been raised from the parametric point of view by
Fellows and Koblitz [8], where they consider the prime finite fields and the bounded Hamming
weight exponents. Their problem is listed among the most important open problems in the
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theory of parameterized complexity [7]. From the above discussions, it is certainly more relevant
to cryptography to treat the finite fields with small characteristic and exponents with bounded
sum-of-digits.
Unlike the case of the integer factorization, where a lot of special purpose algorithms exist,
the discrete logarithm problem is considered more intractable in general. As an example, one
should not use a RSA modulo of about 1000 bits with one prime factor of 160 bits. It would
be vulnerable to the elliptic curve factorization algorithm. However, in the Digital Signature
Standard, adopted by the U.S. government, the finite field has cardinality about 21024 or larger,
while the encryption/decryption is done in a subgroup of cardinality about 2160. As another
example, one should search for a secret prime as random as possible in RSA, while in the case of
the discrete logarithm problem, one may use a finite field of small characteristic, hence the group
of very special order. It is believed that no trapdoor can be placed in the group order, as long
as it has a large prime factor (see the panel report on this issue in the Proceeding of Eurocrypt
1992). In order to have an efficient algorithm to solve the discrete logarithm, we need that every
prime factor of the group order is bounded by a polynomial function on the cardinality of the
field. Given the current state of analytic number theory, it is very hard, if not impossible, to
prove that there exists infinite many of finite fields of even (or constant) characteristic, where the
discrete logarithm can be solved in polynomial time.
In summary, there are several common perceptions about the discrete logarithm problem in
finite fields:
1. As long as the group order has a big prime factor, the discrete logarithm problem is hard.
We may use exponents with small sum-of-digits, since the discrete logarithm problem in
that case seems to be fixed parameter intractable. We gain advantage in speed by using
bounded sum-of-digits exponents, and at the same time keep the problem as infeasible as
using the general exponents.
2. If computing discrete logarithm is difficult, it should be difficult for any generator of the
group. The discrete logarithm problem with respect to one generator can be reduced to
the discrete logarithm problem with respect to any generator. Even though in the small
sum-of-digits case, a reduction is not available, it is not known that changing the generator
of the group affects the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem.
1.2 Our results
In this paper, we show that those perceptions are problematic, by studying the discrete logarithm
problem in large multiplicative subgroups of the Kummer and Artin-Schreier extensions with a
prescribed generator. We prove that the bounded sum-of-digits discrete logarithm are easy in
those groups. More precisely we prove constructively:
Theorem 1 (Main) There exists a random algorithm to find the integer e given g and ge in Fqn
in time polynomial in log(qn) under the conditions:
1. n|q − 1;
2. 0 ≤ e < qn, and Sq(e) ≤ n;
3
3. g = α+ b where Fq(α) = Fqn , b ∈ F∗q and αn ∈ Fq.
Moreover, there does not exist an integer e′ 6= e satisfying that 0 ≤ e′ < qn, Sq(e′) ≤ n and
ge
′
= ge
A few comments are in order:
• For a finite field Fqn , if n|q − 1, then there exists g ∈ Fqn satisfying the condition in the
theorem; if there exists α such that Fq(α) = Fqn and α
n ∈ Fq, then n|q − 1.
• As a comparison, Coppersmith’s algorithm runs in exponential time in the case where ei ∈
{0, 1} for 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, Sq(e) = n2 and q < nO(1), while our algorithm runs in polynomial
time in that case. On the other hand, Coppersmith’s algorithm works for every finite field,
while our algorithm works in Kummer fields. Our result has an indirect affect on an arbitrary
finite field though, since every finite field has extensions of degree close to a given number,
which are Kummer fields. As an example, suppose we want to find an extension of Fq with
degree about log2 q. We first pick a random n close to log q such that (n, q) = 1. Let l be the
order of q in Z/nZ. The field F(ql)n is a Kummer extension of Fql , and an extension of Fq.
According to Theorem 1, there is a polynomial time algorithm which computes the discrete
logarithm to some element g in Fqln provided that the sum-of-digits of the exponent in the
ql-ary expansion is less than n. Hence our result reveals an unexpected property of the
discrete logarithm problem in finite fields: the difficulty of bounded sum-of-digits discrete
logarithm problem drops dramatically if we move up to extensions.
• Numerical evidences suggest that the order of g is close to the group order qn− 1, if it does
not equal to qn − 1. However, it seems hard to prove it. In fact, this is one of the main
obstacles in improving the efficiency of AKS-style primality testing algorithm [2]. We make
the following conjecture.
Conjecture 1 Suppose that a finite field Fqn and an element g in the field satisfy the
conditions in Theorem 1. In addition, n ≥ log q. The order of g is greater than qn/c for an
absolute constant c.
• Even though we can not prove that the largest prime factor of the order of g is very big, it
seems, as supported by numerical evidences, that the order of g, which is a factor of qn − 1
bigger than 2n, is rarely smooth. For instance, in the F2889 = F128127 , any g generates the
whole group F∗2889 . The order 2
889 − 1 contains a prime factor of 749 bits. One should not
attempt to apply the Silver-Pohlig-Hellman algorithm here.
A natural question arises: can the restriction on the sum-of-digits in Theorem 1 be relaxed?
Clearly if we can solve the problem under condition Sq(e) ≤ (q − 1)n in polynomial time, then
the discrete logarithm problem in subgroup generated by g is broken. If g is a generator of F∗qn ,
then the discrete logarithm problem in Fqn and any of its subfields to any base are broken. We
find a surprising relationship between the relaxed problem and the list decoding problem. We are
able to prove:
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Theorem 2 Suppose e is chosen in random from the set
{0 ≤ e < qn − 1|Sq(e) < 1.32n}.
There exists an algorithm given g and ge in Fqn, to find e in time polynomial in log(q
n), with
probability greater than 1− c−n for some constant c greater than 1, under the conditions:
1. n|q − 1;
2. g = α+ b where Fq(α) = Fqn , b ∈ F∗q and αn ∈ Fq.
We also prove a parameterized complexity result concerning the bounded sum-of-digits discrete
logarithm.
Theorem 3 There exists an element g of order greater than 2q in F∗qq−1 , such that the discrete
logarithm problem with respect to the generator g can be solved in time f(w) log4(qq−1), where
f is a subexponential function and w is the bound of the sum-of-digits of the exponent in q-ary
expansion.
This answers an important open question in parameterized complexity for special, yet non-
negligible many, cases.
1.3 Organization of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we list some results of counting numbers with small
sum-of-digits. In Section 3, we present the basic idea and the algorithm, and prove Theorem 1.
In Section 4, we prove Theorem 2 and Theorem 3. In Section 5, we extend the results to Artin-
Schreier extensions. We conclude our paper with discussions of open problems.
2 Numbers with Small Sum-of-digits
Suppose that the q-ary expansion of a positive integer e is
e = e0 + e1q + e2q
2 + · · ·+ en−1qn−1,
where 0 ≤ ei ≤ q − 1 for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1. How many nonnegative integers e less than qn satisfy
Sq(e) = w? The number equals to the number of nonnegative integral solutions of
n−1∑
i=0
ei = w
under the conditions that 0 ≤ ei ≤ q − 1 for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1. Denote the number by N(w,n, q).
The generating function for N(w,n, q) is
(1 + x+ · · ·+ xq−1)n =
∑
i
N(i, n, q)xi.
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If w ≤ q − 1, then the conditions ei ≤ q − 1 can be removed, we have that N(w,n, q) =
(
w+n−1
n−1
)
.
It is easy to see that if q = 2, we have that N(w,n, 2) =
(n
w
)
. In the later section, we will need to
estimate N(w,n, q), where w is n times a small constant less than 2. Since
(1 + x+ · · · + xq−1)n
= (
1− xq
1− x )
n
= (1− xq)n
∞∑
i=0
(
i+ n− 1
n− 1
)
xi
≡ (1− nxq)
2q−1∑
i=0
(
i+ n− 1
n− 1
)
xi (mod x2q)
≡
q−1∑
i=0
(
i+ n− 1
n− 1
)
xi +
2q−1∑
i=q
(
(
i+ n− 1
n− 1
)
− n
(
i− q + n− 1
n− 1
)
)xi (mod x2q)
Hence N(w,n, q) =
(w+n−1
n−1
)− n(w−q+n−1n−1 ) if q ≤ w < 2q.
3 The Basic Ideas and the Algorithm
Our basic idea is adopted from the index calculus algorithm. Let Fqn be a Kummer extension of
Fq, namely, n|q − 1. Assume that q = pd where p is the characteristic. The field Fqn is usually
given as Fp[x]/(u(x)) where u(x) is an irreducible polynomial of degree dn over Fp. If g satisfies
the condition in Theorem 1, then xn−αn must be an irreducible polynomial over Fq. Denote αn
by a. To implement our algorithm, it is necessary that we work in another model of Fqn , namely,
Fq[x]/(x
n − a). Fortunately the isomorphism
ψ : Fp[y]/(u(y)) → Fqn = Fq[x]/(xn − a)
can be efficiently computed. To computer ψ(v(y)), where v(y) is a polynomial of degree at most
dn−1 over Fp, all we have to do is to factor u(y) over Fq[x]/(xn−a), and to evaluate v(y) at one
of the roots. The random algorithm runs in expected time O(dn(dn + log qn)(dn log qn)2), and
the deterministic algorithm runs in time O(dn(dn+ q)(dn log qn)2). From now on we assume the
model Fq[x]/(x
n − a).
Consider the subgroup generated by g = α + b in (Fq[x]/(x
n − a))∗, recall that b ∈ F∗q and
α = x (mod xn− a). The generator g has order greater than 2n [6], and has a very nice property
as follows. Denote a
q−1
n by h, we have
gq = (α+ b)q = αq + b = a
q−1
n α+ b = hα+ b,
and more generally
(α+ b)q
i
= αq
i
+ b = hiα+ b.
In the other word, we obtain a set of relations: logα+b(h
iα + b) = qi for 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. This
corresponds to the precomputation stage of the index calculus. The difference is that, in our
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case, the stage finishes in polynomial time, while generally it requires subexponential time. For a
general exponent e,
(α+ b)e = (α+ b)e0+e1q+···+en−1q
n−1
= (α+ b)e0(hα + b)e1 · · · (hiα+ b)ei · · · (hn−1α+ b)en−1 .
If f(α) is an element in Fqn , where f ∈ Fq[x] is a polynomial of degree less than n, and f(α) =
(α+b)e and Sq(e) < n, then due to unique factorization in Fq[x], f(x) can be completely split into
the product of linear factors over Fq. We can read the discrete logarithm from the factorizations,
after the coefficients are normalized. The algorithm is described as follows.
Algorithm 1 Input: g, ge in Fqn = Fq[x]/(x
n − a) satisfying the conditions in Theorem 1.
Output: e.
1. Define an order in Fq (for example, use the alphabetic order). Compute and sort the list
(1, h, h2, h3, · · · , hn−1).
2. Suppose that ge is represented by f(α), where f ∈ Fq[x] has degree less than n. Factoring
f(x) over Fq, let f(x) = c(x+ d1)
e1 · · · (x+ dk)ek where c, d1, · · · , dk are in Fq.
3. (Normalization) Normalize the coefficients and reorder the factors of f(x) such that their
constant coefficients are b and f(x) = (x+ b)e1 · · · (hn−1x+ b)en−1 , where hi = hi;
4. Output e0 + e1q + · · ·+ en−1qn−1;
The step 1 takes time O(n log2 q log n + n log n log q) = O(n log n log2 q). The most time-
consuming part is to factor a polynomial over Fq with degree at most n. The random algo-
rithm runs in expected time O(n(n + log q)(n log q)2) and the deterministic algorithm runs in
time O(n(n + q)(n log q)2) = O(n3q log2 q). Normalization and reordering can be done in time
O(n log n log q), since we have a sort list of (1, h, h2, h3, · · · , hn−1). The total time complexity
is thus in random time O(n(n + log q)(n log q)2) and in deterministic time O(n3q log2 q). This
concludes the proof of the main theorem.
4 The Parameterized Complexity and The Application of List
Decoding
A natural question arises: can we relax the bound on the sum-of-digits and still get a polynomial
time algorithm? Solving the problem under the condition Sq(e) ≤ (q − 1)n basically renders the
discrete logarithm problems in Fqn and any of its subfields easy. In this section, we consider the
case when Sq(e) ≤ 1.32n. Suppose that ge = f(α) where f(x) ∈ Fq[x] has degree less than n.
Use the same notations as in the previous section, we have
f(α) = (α+ b)e0(hα+ b)e2 · · · (hn−1α+ b)en−1 .
Hence there exists a polynomial t(x) with degree less than 0.32n such that
f(x) + (xn − a)t(x) = (x+ b)e0(hx+ b)e1 · · · (hn−1x+ b)en−1 .
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If there are at least 0.5657n >
√
0.32n · n number of nonzero ei’s, then the curve y = t(x) will
pass at least 0.5657n point in the set
{(i,− f(i)
iq−1 − a)|i ∈ {−b,−
b
h
, · · · ,− b
hn−1
}}.
To find all the polynomials of degree less than 0.32n, which pass at least 0.5657n points in a given
set of n points, is an instance of the list decoding problem. It turns out that there are only a few
of such polynomials, and they can be found efficiently.
Proposition 1 (Guruswami-Sudan [10] ) Given n distinct elements x0, x1, · · · , xn−1 ∈ Fq, n
values y0, y1, · · · , yn−1 ∈ Fq and a natural number k, there are at most O(
√
n3k) many univariate
polynomials t(x) ∈ Fq[x] of degree at most k such that yi = t(xi) for at least
√
nk many points.
Moreover, these polynomials can be found in random polynomial time.
For each t(x), we use the Cantor-Zassenhaus algorithm to factor f(x)+ (xn− a) ∗ t(x). There
must exist a t(x) such that the polynomial f(x) + (xn − a) ∗ t(x) can be completely factored into
a product of linear factors in {hqix + b|0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1}, and e is computed as a consequence. In
order to prove Theorem 2, it remains to show:
Lemma 1 Define
An,q = {(x1, x2, · · · , xn) | x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xn ≤ 1.32n, xi ∈ Z and 0 ≤ xi ≤ q − 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.}
and
Bn = {(x1, x2, · · · , xn) | |{i|xi = 0}| ≥ 0.5657n}.
We have |An,q ∩Bn|
|An,q| < c
−n
for some constant c > 1 when n is sufficiently large.
Proof: The cardinality of An,q is
∑⌊1.32n⌋
i=0 N(i, n, q) >
(2.32n
n
)
> 4.883987...n . The cardinality
of An,q ∩ Bn is less than
∑n
v=⌈0.5657n⌉
(n
v
)( 1.32n
n−v−1
)
. The summands maximize at v = 0.5657n if
v ≥ 0.5657n. Hence we have
n∑
v=⌈0.5657n⌉
(
n
v
)( ⌊1.32n⌋
n− v − 1
)
< 0.5657n
(
n
⌈0.5657n⌉
)( ⌊1.32n⌋
⌊0.4343n⌋
)
< 4.883799...n
This proves the lemma with c = 4.883987.../4.883799... > 1. ✷
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 3. Any f(x) where f(α) = (α+ b)e ∈< α+ b >⊆ Fqq−1 is
congruent to a product of at most w = Sq(e) linear factors modulo x
q−1−a. If w < q−1, we have
an algorithm running in time O(q4 log2 q), according to Theorem 1. So we only need to consider
the case when w ≥ q − 1. The general purpose algorithm will run in random time f(log qq−1),
where f is a subexponential function. Since log qq−1 ≤ w logw, this proves Theorem 3.
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5 Artin-Schreier Extensions
Let p be a prime. The Artin-Schreier extension of a finite field Fp is Fpp . It is easy to show
that xp − x − a = 0 is an irreducible polynomial in Fp for any a ∈ F∗p. So we may take Fpp =
Fp[x]/(x
p − x− a). Let α = x (mod xp − x− a). For any b ∈ Fp, we have
(α+ b)p = αp + b = α+ b+ a,
and similarly
(α+ b)p
i
= αp
i
+ b = α+ b+ ia.
Hence the results for Kummer extensions can be adopted to Artin-Schreier extensions. For the
subgroup generated by α + b, we have a polynomial algorithm to solve the discrete logarithm if
the exponent has p-ary sum-of-digits less than p. Note that b may be 0 in this case.
Theorem 4 There exists an algorithm to find the integer e given g and ge in Fpp in time poly-
nomial in log pp under the conditions:
1. 0 ≤ e < pp, and Sq(e) ≤ p− 1;
2. g = α+ b where Fp(α) = Fpp, b ∈ Fq and αp + α ∈ F∗p.
Moreover, there does not exist an integer e′ 6= e satisfying that 0 ≤ e′ < pp, Sq(e′) ≤ n and
ge
′
= ge.
Theorem 5 There exists an element g of order greater than 2p in F∗pp, such that the discrete loga-
rithm problem with respect to g can be solved in time O(f(w)(log pp)4), where f is a subexponential
function and w is the bound of the sum-of-digits of the exponent in the p-ary expansion.
Theorem 6 Suppose that g = α+ b, where Fp(α) = Fpp, b ∈ Fp and αp + α ∈ F∗p. Suppose e is
chosen in random from the set
{0 ≤ e < qn − 1|Sq(e) < 1.32n}.
There exists an algorithm given g and ge in Fpp, to find e in time polynomial in log(p
p), with
probability greater than 1− c−n for some constant c greater than 1.
6 Conclusion Remarks
A novel idea in the celebrated AKS primality testing algorithm, is to construct a subgroup of large
cardinality through linear elements in finite fields. The subsequent improvements [4, 5, 3] rely
on constructing a single element of large order. It is speculated that these ideas will be useful in
attacking the integer factorization problem. In this paper, we show that they do affect the discrete
logarithm problem in finite fields. We give an efficient algorithm which computes the bounded
sum-of-digits discrete logarithm with respect to prescribed bases in Kummer fields. We emphasize
that this is more than a result which deals with only special cases, as every finite field has
extensions of reasonable degrees which are Kummer fields. One of the most interesting problems
is to further relax the restriction on the sum-of-digits of the exponent. Another important open
problem is to prove Conjecture 1. If that conjecture is true, the AKS-style primality proving can
be made compatible or better than ECPP or the cyclotomic testing in practice.
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